Diplomatic representation, both as a concept and in terms of its structures and processes, does not receive the attention that it deserves. Th is is surprising given that it forms a central concern for both analysts and practitioners of diplomacy, with the latter confronting multiple challenges in adapting modes of representation to changes in their international and domestic political environments. One facet of this can be identifi ed in responses to factors that have assumed a signifi cant place in the development of diplomacy -namely distance and proximity. To the growth of proximity in both spatial and issue-oriented terms, the challenge of the 'special relationship' is added in specifi c contexts. Both factors come together in the case of Canada's attempts to manage its policies towards the United States. Here, strategies have moved through distinct phases responding to domestic and international changes. Th e latest phase, which is associated with substantial rethinking of the role and structure of Foreign Aff airs Canada, assumes the form of what has been labelled the Enhanced Representation Initiative (ERI). Th e ERI is interesting not only in the Canadian-US context, but because it reveals more general problems for governments seeking to manage the pressures of proximity and a growing number of relationships that assume aspects of 'specialness' .
Introduction
Representation is central both to the practice and study of diplomacy. In the case of practice, most diplomatic services are locked in debate as to how it is and should be done, and the need to adapt diplomatic networks to changing environments against a background of diminishing resources. In terms of the academic study of diplomacy, representation assumes a rather diff erent, if obviously related, signifi cance. While the role of diplomatic representation is central to attempts to evaluate the historical development and current state of diplomacy, as is frequently pointed out there is a relative paucity of refl ective thought on the subject. Diplomats, rather than being objects of dispassionate evaluation, oft en become pawns in a game of diplomatic chess in which they are called in support of arguments concerning the health and relevance of diplomatic networks and of the study of diplomacy itself. Discussion lapses too easily into polarized positions in which arguments concerning the demise of diplomacy confront equally vehement assertions that all is well and that any change to practice is ephemeral and, by implication, not worthy of examination. 1 It is not the objective here to rectify this situation in any depth, but some questions will be fl agged concerning the nature of representation in a changing diplomatic milieu. Th is is done in a specifi c context, namely the management of a key variable that colours much discussion of the practice of diplomatic representation and its role and relevance in the light of technological change since the invention of the electric telegraph. Th is key variable is the juxtaposition of distance and proximity in the practice of diplomacy and the machinery that underpins it. In one sense, distance between communities has constituted a key element in the historical development of diplomacyjust as the growth of proximity through communications and information technology has been regarded by some as a factor hastening its decline. Over time, the distance-proximity issue has become more complex, assuming aspects relating to space and time but also to culture, identities and policy agendas that are oft en mediated through epistemic communities operating alongside traditional diplomatic channels. But associated with the interplay between distance and proximity is another concept that has implications for the way in which diplomatic representation is structured -namely, that of 'specialness' in international relationships.
Oft en used to depict dyadic relationships whose nature is assumed to be qualitatively diff erent in some respect from the normal, the idea of the 'special relationship' suggests qualities relating to policy content, but also to the style and process through which policy is conducted. 2 In the latter context, diplomatic representation may be structured to take account of these special circumstances and qualities. Both of these factors intersect in the case under consideration here -the Canada-United States relationship. Not only has this relationship assumed signifi cance in terms of its policy content and structure, in which proximity plays a signifi cant role, but there has been a longstanding debate as to the appropriate methods and strategies for managing the relationship. Th e challenges posed by the Bush administration's policies and the impact of events fl owing from 11 September 2001 have generated renewed debate not only about policy but about how Canada should manage its most signifi cant international relationship. Th is has been reinforced by change in Canada's international policy management structures, not least the decision to split the former Department of Foreign Aff airs and International Trade into two separate entities: Foreign Aff airs Canada (FAC); and International Trade Canada (ITC). As with many foreign services around the world, the place of FAC in the management of Canada's external relations has come under intense scrutiny, as refl ected in the 2005 Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS).
3 Unsurprisingly, management of the relationship with the US has been given close attention, leading to restructuring within the framework 2) For a discussion of the ways in which the term is used, see S. Smith, 'Th e Special Relationship' , Political Studies, vol. 38 of the Enhanced Representation Initiative (ERI), which was formulated in 2004. Th is new framework is seen as an innovative approach to managing Canada's special relationship with the US and a better means of building and managing a 'strong partnership' . According to a senior FAC offi cial closely involved with its development, the ERI is a unique approach to Canadian representation since it encompasses a 'whole-of-government approach' to the US relationship, involving fourteen government departments in the delivery and management of Canadian diplomacy across North America. 4 Th e ERI has expanded Canadian representation with a broader geographical reach of consulates and consuls across the US. Particular emphasis is given to developing Canadian representation in areas 'outside the Beltway': in the south-west, as a response to the shift in power in the US from the east coast to the south-west during the Bush presidency; as well as the north-west, driven by the need to develop better advocacy and business development in this region of notable trade disputes in lumber and wheat.
In the following pages the broader issues of structure and process in Canada's pattern of representation in its powerful southern neighbour are considered, as well as an analysis of the ERI as one example of the response to changing international and domestic demands in international policy management and their impact on the structures of diplomatic representation. Th e discussion is structured as follows. It begins with a brief consideration of where writing on representation fi ts in the contemporary literature on diplomacy. From this, some of the key issues that foreign ministries and their foreign services are confronting in adapting to change are identifi ed, including the interaction between the management of proximity and specialness produced by structural changes within the international system. Pursuing this theme, the current debate on the management of Canadian-US relations, and in particular the changes embraced by the ERI, are examined.
Studying the Structures of Representation
Th e concept of representation is central to the analysis and practice of diplomacy.
5 But, as with diplomacy more generally, the study of representation tends to be fragmentary and oft en lacks substance. Th e image coined by Jørgensen of 'fl oating islands of research' thus applies here, as it does to the broader context of diplomatic studies. 6 In part, as Jönnson and Hall argue, the problem is one of lack of theoretical insights.
7 But another problem relates to the dominant theoretical perspectives determining the way in which diplomatic representation is viewed. Th is, as is not infrequently noted, relates to the dominant discourse of diplomatic studies, which is rooted in realist and neo-realist perspectives. With its emphasis on the signifi cance of international structures, not only has an appreciation of the role of agency in world politics been discouraged -clearly critical to an appreciation of the activities of diplomatic agents -but it has also established a set of boundaries determining the way in which we view diplomacy as an activity. It is not only that fresh perspectives are thereby discouraged, the questions they might pose are either deemed to be irrelevant to the historically determined and immutable purposes of diplomacy or are dismissed as insignifi cant. We thus fi nd the argument that there is nothing new in diplomatic practice aligned with the assumption that developments in that practice -such as an increase in the commercial activities of diplomats or the increased role of non-state actors in diplomacy -are unworthy of note since historical antecedents for them in some form can always be found. 8 Sadly, this results in a polarized dialogue between those who argue that the adaptation of diplomatic structures and processes are inherently interesting and signifi cant, rooted as they are in changes at both the domestic and international levels, Th is is of particular relevance to the ongoing discussion about the role of diplomatic networks and, in particular, the place of the bilateral embassy within them. Th ere is a temptation here to argue that the mere continued existence of the structures of bilateralism proves that all is well with them. Not only does this reduce discussion of change in representation to simplistic and distorted arguments, but it actually fails to connect with what is happening in the 'real world' of diplomacy. Here, the dominant themes of external challenge and internal adaptation underpin the proliferation of papers and reports (such as that contained in the Canadian IPS) on change in FAC and its overseas networks. 10 It is easy to view these reports as an indication of a renaissance of national diplomatic systems, but they can equally be viewed, rather more critically, as organizational survival strategies underpinned by bureaucratic and political inertia with regard to the mission, purpose and eff ectiveness of the foreign ministry and diplomatic service.
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Against this background, few students of international relations have sought to analyse the role of the representative in diplomatic networks. It is quite rare to fi nd work such as Wolfe's, which, having decided that diplomatic networks are worth looking at, then seeks to explain why resident ambassadors still exist and why middle powers -such as Canada -maintain signifi cant patterns of representation.
12 Th e answer to the fi rst question, Wolfe suggests, lies in the role of multiple acts of diplomatic recognition. One such act is the representation of Canada, in the conventional sense, in the diplomatic system of states, regional and international organizations. Another is the reproduction of Canada by ambassadors, missions and consulates. Th is 9) Lee dual act of recognition is constitutive of an international system that is the inter-subjective creation of states. In this context, ambassadors are therefore 'central to the social reproduction of the society of states' . 13 In terms of the second question -the growth of diplomatic representation -Wolfe sees this as linked to familiar debates about globalization and the collapse of time and space. Drawing on the analogy of decisions made by fi rms regarding international investment, he suggests that ministries of foreign aff airs (MFAs) reach not dissimilar conclusions as to the benefi ts of an international presence. Additionally, the growing density of international relationships reinforces the need to know what other actors are doing and their perceptions of their environments. Th is questions the familiar observation -or assumptionthat globalization weakens the rationale for the structures and processes of diplomacy rather than, as Cohen has suggested, enhances the need for them. 14 Th is resonates with the debate concerning the impact of distance on the practice of diplomacy that was generated by the invention of the electric telegraph. While posing the obvious issue of the utility of ambassadors in an age of instant communication, this suggested more far-reaching questions regarding the conduct of foreign policy, the organization of foreign ministries and the patterns of international politics. 15 While members of the diplomatic profession were by no means in agreement as to the consequences of the new technology, a familiar response to the reduction of distance and consequent closer proximity of centre and periphery in national diplomatic systems was symbolized by the lament of the British ambassador in Vienna, Sir Horace Rumbold, regarding 'the telegraphic demoralization of those who formerly had to act for themselves ' . 16 Th e debate concerning the impact of information and communications technology on the practice of representation is part of the broader debate on the relationship between principal and agent and the related issue of the extent to which the ambassador is -or should be -independent of the government that he/she represents. 17 Proximity is clearly a factor here, but its impact is far from obvious. On one level, the argument that the diminution of distance has demoted the signifi cance of resident missions is countered by the enhanced complexity of information fl ows, the closer texture of political arenas and the engagement of a growing diversity of actors (both governmental and non-governmental) in diplomatic processes. As the Paschke Report on the role of German embassies within the European Union suggests, this can lead to counter-intuitive consequences. On the one hand, Paschke argues, the increasingly dense patterns of relations among EU member states have not reduced the need for bilateral representation: 'proximity has not produced intimacy' in intra-EU relations, and the belief that it has is characterized as the 'illusion of familiarity' . 18 Paschke goes on to make the point that it is only the embassy on the spot that can deliver a broad overall assessment of the pattern of relations between Germany and the host EU state, and that such an awareness is critical to the management of an environment in which proximity requires blending the forms of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, the erosion of space and time as a factor in diplomacy carries with it implications for how foreign ministries and their networks of posts relate to one another in terms of structures and allocation of tasks. Th e picture within EU foreign ministries is generally one where technological change has resulted in greater integration of the ministry and posts, with increasing reliance being placed on posts as the repository of country-related skills as geographical desks in the ministry are scaled down. interviews -is that they can become instruments of social learning in a wide range of areas from health and education reform to the management of terrorist threats. In so doing, their home 'client' departments lie outside the MFA, as do their interlocutors in the receiving state. In the Canadian context, a senior public offi cial has noted how Health Canada (the federal government's department dealing with public health issues) now expects Canadian missions to be, among other things, 'knowledge brokers' , acting as agents whereby one government can learn from another in a wide range of policies developed within similar societies.
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Th e second issue -namely the factors determining choice in the pattern of overseas representation from a 'sending' state -has not received much systematic attention. A rare attempt to adopt a 'scientifi c' approach to the matter is provided by Webster, who examines the factors determining the decisions of fi ve Commonwealth member states in allocating scarce resources to diplomatic representation. His conclusion is that geopolitical considerations are of signifi cantly greater importance than any sense of common ties with fellow member states of the Commonwealth. 21 Th is poses interesting questions as to the signifi cance for representational structures of what are deemed to be special relationships. In one sense, of course, all dyadic relationships are unique and therefore 'special' . But the term has oft en been used to refer to a set of relationships of specifi c importance to at least one of a pair of states. 22 Not surprisingly, one of the states in each pair is the current hegemonic state in the international system. In diff ering contexts, therefore, the UK-US, Australia-US, Israel-US and Canada-US relationships are regarded as 'special' -at least by the non-US partner in each case. It is not the purpose here to analyse the context and content of 'specialness' in each situation, although the case of Canada and the US will be studied shortly. But it is relevant to note in passing that distance and proximity play 20 diff erently in each case. Comparisons have thus been made between Canada and Australia in terms of strategies for managing proximity and specialness in a changed global environment. Burney has suggested that Australia has been more successful in dealing with Washington because it lacks 'the luxury of proximity' and thus takes nothing for granted. Canada, on the other hand, seems 'to have become peripheral by choice and despite our proximity' . 23 Despite obvious diff erences, there are common threads woven within each of these so-called special relationships. Th ese commonalities can be termed 'politicization' , 'centralization' and 'domestication' . Politicization refl ects the signifi cance of a special relationship in the management of foreign policy, and the fact that for the 'minor' state, this will assume signifi cant political importance. One consequence of this political importance may be the utilization of summit diplomacy, as in the Mulroney-Reagan phase of Canada-US relations or the Bush-Blair summitry in the run-up to the Iraq war. Another is likely to be the politicization of the head of mission post itself, as senior political fi gures rather than professional diplomats assume this role. Th e second common thread -centralization -fl ows from the fi rst. Th e more important a relationship is deemed to be, the greater the tendency for its management to be supplemented by agencies outside the foreign ministry (such as prime ministerial or cabinet offi ces) -or even removed from the foreign ministry's remit. Finally, domestication has several connotations, chief among them being the centrality of a 'special relationship' to the domestic politics of each of the partners. Canadian domestic politics, for example, are oft en played out in the context of the importance of being diff erent from the US in policy areas such as health and the environment. Th e way in which strategies for managing the relationship are developed is also important, since these may be rooted in perceptions of the special relationship as lying closer to the 'domestic' end of the foreigndomestic policy spectrum (in management terms this is refl ected in Ottawa's decision to create a new secretariat in the Washington embassy in April 2004 to improve links between key domestic political actors and the US). 24 As is indicated below, the danger here is to misinterpret the way in which the partner state -especially a hegemonic power such as the US -perceives the relationship and, consequently, to commit errors of judgement both in terms of policy content and process.
Before leaving the more general issues surrounding the analysis of diplomatic representation, it is worth noting that lack of theorizing is accompanied by lack of empirical data. In the Canadian case, Wolfe identifi es a paucity of material and this is echoed in other countries. 25 Much relevant literature assumes the form of diplomatic memoirs, which tend to provide tantalizing glimpses rather than sustained discussions of the work of diplomatic missions and their staff . Hence the memoirs of the UK's ambassador in Washington DC from 1997-2003 provide some interesting shaft s of light on the way in which an ambassador operates in the US capital, as well as the somewhat fraught relationship between the embassy and the staff of the British prime minister's offi ce in London.
26 It is relatively rare for a former diplomat to provide a sustained discussion of the role of the contemporary diplomat as Rana has done in the course of several books. 27 Generally, this paucity of data is as characteristic of the Canadian diplomatic system as it is of others. But if there is one exception it is the US-Canada relationship.
Managing the US-Canada Relationship
Th e very character of the Canada-US relationship, as Derek Burney, a former Canadian ambassador to Washington notes, is a 'perennial challenge' refl ecting the 'Canadian conundrum' , which is rooted in reconciling the perception of the United States as a friend with a frequently manifested impulse to maintain a distance from the US's policies. 28 Th is leads us back to the impact of proximity and specialness in determining both the content of Canada's US policies and the modalities through which they are managed. Th e perception of a special relationship implies that the rules of power and pursuit of national interest are in some sense and to some degree relaxed. Proximity serves to reinforce this belief. However, Susan Rice, a former US State Department offi cial, argues that while Canada might have a presence in Washington, the degree of access that it enjoys is limited. 29 Put another way, proximity is not power. It can, however, be translated into infl uence by judicious diplomacy, as in the case of the Smart Border Action Plan that was negotiated in the wake of '9/11' and was intended to enhance cross-border security by establishing the principle that two dimensions of proximitynational security and economic security -are not competing objectives.
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Successful attempts at infl uence, Rice concludes, can be reinforced by creating structures of specialness -such as bilateral consultative mechanisms modelled on those between the EU and the US. 31 In one sense, Canada is no stranger to diplomatic innovation of this kind, and the following section will consider some of the forms that this has taken.
Indeed, Canada is oft en regarded as a 'laboratory' in which experiments in diff erent diplomatic styles are conducted. Notable among these is the experience provided by the Ottawa Process in dealing with the antipersonnel landmines' issue. Cooper, among other authors, has discussed the nature and merits of 'mission-oriented' diplomacy -that is, diplomacy that is issue-focused and characterized by partnerships with civil society and non-governmental organizations in particular. 32 Th is stands in contrast to 'traditional' structures of permanent representation, which are seen as lacking the fl exibility, focus and responsiveness of this 'new' model of diplomacy. As is oft en the case, this is in fact a weaving together of long-established forms of diplomatic practice (diplomacy by mission) with techniques relating to the contemporary environment. 33 But in examining Canada's involvement in the Organization of American States' (OAS) mission to Peru, Cooper claims that this was an example of 'hybrid' diplomacy in the sense that it represented a meshing of traditional forms and newer techniques. Th us the Canadian embassy in Lima was critical to the overall process rather than sidelined by alternative channels of communication.
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In the case of Canadian-US diplomacy, a parallel debate as to the most appropriate forms for promoting Canadian objectives in the US arena has developed. Th e distinction here is between the rival merits of what is termed 'quiet' diplomacy -associated with the Pearson era and conducted through formal diplomatic channels -and what we would now describe as a form of public diplomacy whose style is more open and methods of working focused on a broader set of actors and interests than that of a narrow foreign policy elite.
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Understanding the signifi cance of these two forms of diplomacy requires an appreciation of their context and, in particular, the policy content of the relationship. Th e logic of the ERI is underpinned by external eventsthe attacks on the US carried out on 11 September 2001 -and their consequences, just as an earlier change in Canada's diplomatic management strategies in Washington DC was stimulated by the 'Nixon Shock' of August 1971 involving, among other things, a 10 per cent surcharge on imports into the United States. Th is was regarded as marking the end of the 'special relationship' between the two countries -just as were the events following '9/11' some 30 years later. In both cases, the Canadian political and diplomatic establishments were galvanized into profound refl ection on both the substance and management of the relationship. Tensions across the border were intensifi ed by the Trudeau government's attempts to steer a more autonomous course vis-à-vis Washington through a diversifi ed international policy termed the 'third option' . But by the early 1980s, offi cials agreed that Canada needed a more coherent strategy in dealing with the US, one that recognized the growing complexity of the processes attending the conduct of the US's international policy. To a degree, this complexity was matched by a growing international voice on the part of the Canadian provinces. Against this background, a prominent Canadian public servant, Alan Gotlieb, assumed the role of ambassador to the US in 1981, holding the position beyond the Trudeau years and into the Progressive Conservative Mulroney government that was elected in 1984. Gotlieb's ambassadorial career is remarkable in two key ways. First he developed a conceptual framework and set of operational principles for the delivery of a more energetic and extensive diplomacy than previous ambassadors to the US. Second, he analysed its principles and practices. 37 In fact, much of what was termed 'public diplomacy' diff ers from current usage where the focus is literally on access to the public and civil society. Rather, Gotlieb's strategy was far more comprehensive, focusing on elites both inside and outside the Beltway as well as groups and interests whose attitudes might impact on Canada's relationship with the US in its broadest terms. Echoing the ERI proposals more than two decades later, attention was given to the network of Canadian consulates beyond their traditional roles in trade, tourism and immigration. 38 Th ere were clear implications for the operation of the Canadian embassy at the centre of the network as it sought, for example, to determine the political origins of pressure for new US domestic regulations in Congress that might impact on Canada:
Th e embassy had to learn who wanted the new regulation, who their allies were, and what could be off ered. His [Gotlieb's] task was to know fi rst what issues mattered for Canada, then which group of American actors was engaged on the issue. 39 However, such activity was only part of the story as various diplomatic structures and processes sought to underpin the relationship's 'specialness' . Having major responsibilities for the Washington-Ottawa relationship from 1983-1993, Burney was well placed to analyse the shift ing trends in management style. Th us in a period marked by tensions over transnational issues such as the National Energy Policy and acid rain in the early 1980s, quarterly meetings between the Canadian Secretary of State for External Aff airs and the US Secretary of State were introduced. With the advent of Canada's Mulroney government in 1984, these meetings were supplemented by annual summits between the Canadian prime minister and US president. Special envoys were also introduced to deal with sensitive issues. But despite this architecture of specialness, Burney argues that Canada's Washington embassy was central to the management of bilateral disputes:
Th e general objective for the embassy in my time was to debate forcefully with our opponents while trying to build coalitions of support wherever possible from those constituents who would suff er from US restrictions on specifi c Canadian products. On soft wood lumber, for instance, this meant rallying the US homebuilders' associations, namely those consumers who would pay higher prices if duties were applied to Canadian imports.
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Managing the Post-'9/11' Relationship Th e impact of events since the attacks on the US in September 2001 have stimulated the conundrums in Canada's proximate relationship with its powerful neighbour but have done so in an even more dramatic context. Th e closure of the Canadian-US border aft er 11 September emphasized the new vulnerability that disruption of 'just-in-time' assembly lines presented to Canada in an era of sensitive global and regional supply chains. Not surprisingly, the reassertion of the centrality of the Canadian-US relationship (what Welsh terms 'foreign policy as Canada-US relations') 41 has become a familiar theme. One possible consequence of this situation might be the 'domestication' of foreign policy in two ways. Th e fi rst, Welsh argues, is for Canada to abandon its foreign policy pretensions and model itself on Switzerland's preoccupation with improving its domestic environment. relationship with the pre-eminent political reality within Canada, namely federal-provincial relations. 43 Haynal's argument here is that, fi rst, the US relationship is becoming less diplomatic and more constitutional, and, second, that asymmetry is growing in the management of these two key relationships. While federal-provincial relations are marked by a coherence of approach, the Canadian-US relationship is quite the opposite. Haynal's suggestion is that management of these two relationships should be integrated under the minister for intergovernmental aff airs. Th is would be accompanied by a realignment of bureaucratic responsibilities and the creation of a North American Service within FAC made up of foreign service personnel, members of domestic departments and representatives of provinces, municipalities and the private sector. Th is, he suggests, would separate management of the relationship from the broader spectrum of foreign policy and make it more akin to relationships among EU member states. 44 Underpinning this debate lie contrasting images of the character of the relationship itself and the role of diplomacy within it. Wolfe has thus argued that pressures for the closer integration of the two countries fail to appreciate both the character of the issues at stake, the character of US political institutions and processes and how Canada might most eff ectively achieve its objectives in managing the relationship. Rather than seeking to bundle the relationship into a constitutional package, he suggests that a fl exible and multifaceted 'Swiss Army knife' diplomacy that recognizes the reality of diff use sites of authority and political interest would best serve Canada's interests.
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Th e ERI
Against this background of sustained debate concerning the management of the Canada-US relationship, the current phase -focused on the Enhanced Representation Initiative -contains familiar as well as newer themes. In one sense, it refl ects patterns of institutional learning applied to the organization of representation in increasingly complex environments. Th us the concept of public diplomacy that was such a feature of the Gotlieb era has come to be accepted as an inseparable component of a more holistic approach to representation in the US arena. But to this has been added recognition that there are weaknesses in the government-based structures of diplomacy. One such weakness is the level of representation in the US -seen as too limited prior to the implementation of the ERI. Key political and economic developments suggested that Canada's infl uence over the US was diminishing. Th e election of George W. Bush in 2000 and increased migration to the south and south-west highlighted the need for Canadian advocacy in these increasingly infl uential regions, especially since Canadians traditionally identify with Democrats more easily than with Republicans. Canada's refusal to join the US in the war against Iraq generated a growing sense of public hostility in the US towards Canada. High-profi le US-Canadian trade disputes in lumber and wheat damaged trade relations and, despite NAFTA, Canada was not gaining in US markets. Moreover, the share of US investment in Canada was falling. In 2004 it looked as if proximity was more of a hindrance than a benefi t to the bilateral relationship.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a key conclusion of the 2002 report from the Canadian House of Commons' Standing Committee on Foreign Aff airs and International Trade on Canada's relations within North America was the need to strengthen its diplomatic presence in the US -which is far weaker than that maintained by Mexico. 46 Th is touches on a much broader concern about the level and allocation of Canada's overseas representation. One of the themes in Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) is the recognition that there is an imbalance in staffi ng in Ottawa and at overseas missions, a refl ection of cost-cutting over many years, resulting in lessened capacity 'to advocate Canadian interests and to properly inform decision-making at home' . 47 Th us whereas the G8 average for MFA offi cials on overseas postings is around 50 per cent, for Canada the fi gure is closer to 25 per cent.
But the ERI concept has to be seen against broader concerns regarding the structures of international policy management and the role of them. As with many foreign services, these concerns are rooted in familiar propositions regarding the changing nature of diplomacy, particularly the growing interconnectedness of domestic and international policy, which, according to the IPS, constitutes the roots of the 'new diplomacy' . Refi ning the model of diplomacy demanded by this scenario produces an image of diplomacy as a much broader networking exercise. Th e Canadian context presents three dimensions of diff usion in diplomatic management: bureaucratic; territorial; and societal. Although these are clearly interrelated, they refl ect distinct realities in the conduct of international policy. Th e fi rst form of diff usion -bureaucratic -is the growing involvement of other government departments in international policy. Not only does this present signifi cant issues for the foreign ministry's relationship with other government departments in the domestic bureaucratic milieu, but the proportion of foreign service offi cers in overseas posts (23 per cent) is relatively small in terms of the overall level of personnel. Territorial diff usion derives from the federal system of government and the enhanced involvement of the provinces in international policy issues. As the IPS notes, the eff ectiveness of Canada's diplomacy in critical areas increasingly depends on cooperation between the two levels of government. Finally, societal diff usion moves the focus outside the governmental arena and into those of business and civil society, recognizing that both are assuming enhanced signifi cance as players in many diplomatic environments. More generally, the impact of international events on the population at large, the result of growing international mobility, places greater pressures on the interface between the foreign service and the 'consumers' of a particular diplomatic 'product' .
All of these developments reinforce a concern that is common to foreign ministries, that of coordination and speaking with a 'single voice' in international policy arenas. Whereas this is seen as a signifi cant challenge, it can also provide a rationale for the MFA as the main locus of coordination. In the case of FAC, this is defi ned as the 'integrator' role encompassing both the framing of the international policy agenda and its projection abroad. 48 Yet as several offi cials have commented, this integrator role can only be eff ective if FAC is seen by other government departments as adding value to their work, and the evidence for this is mixed. Th ere has been little resistance to FAC's coordination on issues such as the avian fl u pandemic, but on issues such as security, trade and science policy, other government departments question whether FAC has a mandate or suffi cient expertise to play the integrating function. Th ere is a tendency for departments to resent FAC's coordinating role, and in these areas the 'whole-of-government' approach is sometimes replaced by what has been described by some FAC offi cials as a 'silo approach' . In the absence of a 'habit of cooperation' , as one offi cial put it, FAC is above all dependent on the political will and ambition of ministers to push the 'whole-of-government' agenda as much as any bureaucratic logic of policy coordination.
Th e structures and processes of representation are key dimensions of the integrator logic and this can be seen in the case of the ERI. As indicated above, this was stimulated in part by the events following '9/11' , but also by recognition that there was a need to strengthen what has been identifi ed as the knowledge-broker role of missions and a series of confl icts over issues on the social policy agenda, such as guns, abortion and decriminalizing drugs. 49 In one sense, therefore, it has been an exercise in improving advocacy through more eff ective public diplomacy. In the words of one FAC offi cial, 'the ERI refl ected a need to be closer to the ground -in our relations with Congress, for example -but also with the media. Th e aim has been, on the one hand, to develop an evergreen stock of responses to the US media and a capacity to deliver real-time responses to key issues as they arise' .
50
But the ERI also recognizes that the management of proximity and special relationships presents other problems, not least the overseas equivalents of the coordination problem. 'Stronger' representation has thus partly meant enhancing the diplomatic network in the US. At the time of launching the ERI in September 2003, the aim was to increase signifi cantly the level of Canadian representation through opening new consulates (six by December 2005) together with a new consulate-general in Denver, thereby increasing the overall network to 22 offi ces. 51 Th ese have been supplemented by appointing thirteen honorary consuls, with more appointments planned. Canada's current ambassador to Washington, Frank McKenna, has explained the rationale for this in the following terms:
Why the emphasis on getting outside the Beltway? Because we know where the action is. It's on the ground, in the states. Because we know where key decision-makers are and where they come from -the states. Because we know where the market opportunities are for Canadian and US businesses alike -whether it is biotech in Phoenix, or Silicon Valley South in Houston. Because we know it is a whole lot easier to resolve issues at the retail level before they become gridlocked by Washington politics. 52 Th is particular institutional choice of representation raises interesting questions. While some feel that consuls can be eff ective in what they do -mainly trade and investment promotion -others feel that eff ective representation beyond business and trade advocacy requires an ambassador. One offi cial has remarked that 'the title gives you the impact' . Th us the higher the rank, the higher the level and greater the extent of infl uence. Given that most of the new posts under the ERI are honorary consuls who report to FAC and not the Canadian ambassador, this may well put institutional and symbolic limits on the representation boost in many areas. Related to this issue is the current recruitment problem within the ERI. Several of the consular posts remain unfi lled despite recruitment drives. Th is is as much to do with the endemic problem in foreign ministries that consular work is perceived as a 'backwater activity' . But many of the ERI's posts are -by choice -remote and far removed from the centre, making them particularly unattractive to offi cials seeking the next career move. If the posts cannot be fi lled, Canadian representation is then not being extended into what FAC sees as crucial avenues for Canadian advocacy and business development.
Th e Initiative also recognizes the linkage between coordination at the centre and eff ective representation. A central feature has thus been the establishment of a partnership between key departments and agencies (eight in mid-2005), which intends to provide an integrated approach to managing advocacy, trade, business development, science and technology and investment interests in the US. 53 One aim of the Initiative is to deal with a characteristic problem of overseas networks comprising an ever-greater range of non-MFA offi cials -namely, who sets priorities for a mission? As the IPS notes, Canada's missions abroad host fi ft een government departments, six agencies and three provinces. 54 In such a situation, 'tasking the network' becomes a critical issue, spanning activity at the centre and throughout the structure of a complex network of representation such as Canada's in the US. By establishing a partnership, strategic priorities can be established and a governance structure created to oversee the work of the posts. It is claimed that a voice in setting priorities enhances the incentive for other government departments to become involved in the partnership. A positive view from the ground is provided by the consul at one of the new posts, located in Anchorage. She notes that the Initiative, which includes Industry Canada and Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, is very much a partnership: 'It's about getting rid of "stovepipes" and having greater coordination in our eff orts' . 55 Under a restructuring of the geographic branches, management of relations within North America has been concentrated in FAC within a new North America Branch that oversees the ERI.
Th e territorial dimension of diff usion has been addressed at the level of the Canadian embassy's structure in Washington. In April 2004 the establishment of a secretariat was announced, whose aim, according to then Prime Minister, Paul Martin, is 'to improve the management and coherence of our relations with the US' . 56 Th is is directed specifi cally towards the provinces and Canadian parliament, providing for co-location of provincial and territorial representatives at the embassy as well as supporting visiting parliamentarians and the activities of the Canada-US Inter-Parliamentary Group. At the same time, it was announced that provinces and territories had been invited to assign staff to any one of the consulates 'to add their expertise and infl uence to Canada's message' . 57 It is clear that the ERI is a bold and in some ways unique attempt to develop and manage a special relationship with Canada's hegemonic neighbour, in which new forms of representation are now emerging. As highlighted above, the ERI faces many institutional and cultural challenges. As an experiment in developing new forms of representation, the ERI off ers an interesting model that some offi cials in Canada believe can be applied to other key bilateral relationships, such as Mexico, China and the EU.
Conclusion
Th is discussion began with some general points concerning the study of representation in the literature on diplomacy. It was suggested that understanding the development of structure and process in diplomatic representation has been hindered by two factors. Th e fi rst lies in how diplomacy has been approached in much academic literature and the consequent treatment of representation. Too oft en there has been a tendency to focus on arguments relating to the relative importance or unimportance of the machinery of representation in world politics, with much of this attention being given to the respective roles of bilateral and multilateral representation. One consequence has been to overlook the ways in which the roles are adapting to change and intersecting with each other in increasingly complex processes, as evident in multi-layered diplomatic arenas such as the EU.
Even less attention is given to the machinery of diplomacy and the ways in which it is evolving in response to domestic and international demands. Th is is because of lack of good information, which is oft en the fault of foreign ministries themselves as well as the inclination of diplomatic memoirs to explain what was done while being silent on how it was done. And yet it is quite obvious that important changes are occurring in the patterns and strategies of representation, not least in the sphere of consular work, which, according to some diplomats, is now a major preoccupation of foreign services rather than being the poor relation of yesteryear.
A central assumption that underlies the foregoing discussion is that patterns and forms of representation are signifi cant indicators of change in the international order and the way that its constituent elements respond to this change. One feature of change in a world order marked by the twin forces of globalization and regionalization is the interplay of ideas that have long underpinned debates concerning the signifi cance of representation and how representation should respond to developments in information and communications technology, for example.
Th e collapse of distance and enhancement of proximity have traditionally been regarded as lessening representation's importance. Such a conclusion may be reinforced by the development of special relationships that are deemed to lie beyond the pale of diplomacy and to represent an alternative post-diplomatic order. Th is suggests that examining how the diplomacy of proximity and specialness actually functions can reveal interesting sidelights on the nature of a transitional international order, the character of which is far from certain. But whereas the interplay of distance and proximity is a well-understood theme in writings on diplomacy and has certainly loomed large in an era of dramatic change in communications beginning with the electric telegraph, this has become a far more complex variable as proximity assumes additional dimensions to the purely spatial. While the current post-'9/11' preoccupation within foreign ministries is with public diplomacy in its various manifestations, there are other stories to be told about the impact of proximity on diplomacy's tasks. First, the proximity of societies, identities and social values is increasing the role of the mission as a node in knowledge networks, whether these are concerned with tackling international terrorism or dealing with the threat of global pandemics. In some of its forms, this may have little resonance for traditional notions of foreign policy, and poses signifi cant issues about the character of national diplomatic networks, their function and whose interests they serve. Second, diplomatic services now have to come to terms with diplomacy being viewed as a consumer good. Rather than being associated solely with the distant processes of negotiation on issues far removed from the everyday concerns of the general public, a combination of mass tourism and a rising culture of expectations as to what governments can and should do for their citizens abroad is transforming the approach to managing crises and disaster situations and enhancing the role of consular services.
Th e case of managing Canada's relationship with the US casts light on the interplay of proximity and specialness, which resonates with the dilemmas of representation that are confronting governments in other arenas. Th e Canadian experience indicates that balancing the advantages and disadvantages of proximity and specialness is no small task. Strategies have to be selected and the outcomes of these strategies evaluated. Each phase in representational management has had its strengths and weaknesses. While the era of 'quiet diplomacy' was deemed inappropriate in an era marked by profound international and domestic political change, the public diplomacy of the Gotlieb era carried with it the seeds of its own problems, in the shape of generating expectations regarding policy infl uence in the US that it was not always able to deliver. What is interesting about the ERI is not that it is simply an exercise in public diplomacy for the troubled post-'9/11' global environment, but that it also builds on a recognition of other issues that are seizing foreign ministries' attention. Among these is the centrality of the coordination imperative, which is both a real problem in the articulation and management of international policy but also provides a rationale for the continued existence of foreign ministries in a world of internationalized sectoral ministries. In this light, the concept of partnership among government departments and agencies, combined with Canada's objective of aligning federal foreign policy responsibilities with provincial international policy interests and ambitions, strikes a chord in the broader debates on how representation is delivered, not least in terms of how missions are tasked. What Canada has produced in the current -that is, ERI -phase in the long-running history of managing its relationship with its powerful southern neighbour is a hybridized form of representation that is rooted in the realities -and delusions -of proximity and specialness. Th is hybrid seeks to recognize the elements of foreignness and domesticity in the relationship and to produce a mode of representational strategy that can accommodate both. Although by defi nition unique, it carries with it lessons that resonate with debates in other foreign services.
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